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Abstract: 
 
After launching its national strategy to promote nanotechnology development in 2001, China has 
devoted an increasing amount of R&D investment from government and industry to the field, 
produced a soaring number of scientific publications, established several new specialized 
institutions, and expanded its postgraduate programs in related subjects. The hope that China can 
pass through a window of opportunity to catch up and become a leading nation in 
nanotechnology has never been higher. However, an evaluation of the Chinese performance 
according to targets set in the national strategy suggests that China has lagged behind most 
advanced countries in terms of the impact (citations) of its scientific research. China has not yet 
performed satisfactorily in the areas of commercialization and application of the technology 
either, due to the limited technological capabilities of indigenous companies and a lack of 
incentives for them to actively engage in commercialization and industrial development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
China’s global rise in research and development (R&D) in nanoscience and nanotechnology 
(hereafter referred to as “nanotechnology”) has been phenomenal in the past decade. In 1998, 
there were merely 1,875 scientific publications out of China, compared with 9,468 in the US and 
4,423 in Japan.1 In 2007 Chinese nanotechnology publications outnumbered those from Japan by 
a wide margin and occupied second place in the world in terms of number of publications, 
trailing only the US. China’s share in the world’s nanotechnology publications was only 6 
percent in 1998. By 2007, however, China accounted for 19 percent. Figure 1 lists the number of 
nanotechnology publications produced by the world’s 10 most prolific countries over the 1998–
2007 period. A calculation of the average annual growth rate in the number of articles by the 10 
most prolific countries reveals rapid growth in China, South Korea, and India. China’s average 
annual growth rate of 27 percent each year between 1998 and 2007 is nothing short of 
extraordinary. In contrast, the other countries in the top 10, including the US, Japan, Germany, 
France, the UK, Italy, and Russia achieved only 6 to 10 percent rates in annual growth.  
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
China’s progress is less impressive in patenting than in publishing. Counting the patent 
applications with the European Patent Office’s nanotechnology classification Y01N in the 
PATSTAT database,2 we find that Chinese patents accounted for only 0.88 percent of the 
world’s total, in comparison with the US share of 34.2 percent and the Japanese share of 19.7 
percent. Although China’s share is very small, the number of the patents filed by Chinese 
applicants grew rapidly, at an average rate of 36.8 percent per year, from 1998 through 2007 
(Figure 2). Excepting South Korea, where the rate grew by an extraordinary 77.7 percent 
                                                 
1
 The analysis of scientific publications in this article is based on the MERIT Database of Worldwide 
Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. It is composed by scientific publications indexed by the Web of Science. 
The search strategy used to define nanotechnology publications is developed by the Georgia Institute of Technology 
and described in Porter et al. [1]. Huang et al. [2] compared this search strategy and other popular strategies. 
2
 Throughout this paper, a nanotechnology patent is defined as a patent with a Y01N classification. The 
classification code Y01N is attached to a patent application when the patent examiner at the European Patent Office 
considers it to be related to nanotechnology. A detailed introduction of the Y01N classification is provided by Scheu 
et al [5]. 
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annually, the applications in the rest of the top 10 countries increased more slowly than in China. 
Some leading countries, such as Japan and France, have seen negative rates of growth in 
nanotechnology patents.   
 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
According to Lux Research [3], the US and Japanese governments invested US$1816 million 
and US$1060 million (by purchasing power parity or PPP), respectively, on nanotechnology 
R&D in the 2005–2007 period. The Chinese government invested US$PPP893 million in the 
same period, which positions China in third place in the worldwide ranking (Figure 3). However, 
corporate funding in China amounted to only US$PPP348 million, which was only slightly more 
than one-third of government funding. Ranked by corporate funding, China was ranked fifth in 
the world after the US (US$PPP2,362 million), Japan (US$PPP2,038 million), Germany 
(US$PPP467 million) and South Korea (US$PPP384 million). A different estimation by the 
European Commission [4] showed that the Chinese government invested 83 million euros in 
2004 on nanotechnology R&D, in comparison with the US government’s 1.2 billion euros and 
the Japanese government’s 750 million euros. China was thus ranked after the US, Japan, 
Germany, France, South Korea, and the UK by amount of public investment in nanotechnology 
R&D in 2004. Indicators of scientific publications, patent applications and public and corporate 
funding all reveal that China has been closing the gap with the leading countries in this emerging 
technology field in the past decade and is becoming a major player in the world. 
 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
 
Interestingly, China began to make strides in the field of nanotechnology rather early, almost at 
the same time that other advanced countries decided to boost their investments. As evidence of 
this, China’s National Nanotechnology Development Strategy (2001–2010) was announced in 
the same year as the National Nanotechnology Initiative in the US. However, China’s 
enthusiastic embrace of nanotechnology in the early 2000s was neither rooted in a solid forecast 
projecting when the technology would mature and be commercialized nor backed by confidence 
that indigenous Chinese industries would have the capacity to reap the fruits of scientific 
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development in the country. In a country whose GDP per capita was merely US$949 in 2000 (at 
2000 prices), there were surely many acute challenges that the government had to meet. In this 
sense, large-scale government investment in China seems difficult to be justified. Questions thus 
emerge in a retrospective review of Chinese policy and funding programs that support 
nanotechnology development. What motivates Chinese science and technology policy makers to 
resolutely concentrate the country’s limited resources on this emerging field? How do we assess 
progress in nanotechnology R&D in China? These questions have been circulated in the 
international S&T community, but they are rarely addressed in scholarly work. 
 
In this paper, we aim to fill the gap in the literature by assessing the development of 
nanotechnology in China through the perspective of technological catching-up and economic 
development. We study Chinese organizations that are engaged in nanotechnology R&D, S&T 
programs that support this field, and the key policies that have contributed and continue to 
contribute to technology development. By drawing insights from the theory of technological 
catching-up and economic development, we discuss the so-called Chinese model of promoting 
nanotechnology development and its implications for other developing countries. The remainder 
of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on technological 
leapfrogging and catching-up and discusses the motivation behind the Chinese government’s 
investment in developing nanotechnology. Section 3 reviews the key policies enacted by the 
Chinese government and identifies the targets set in policy documents in order to evaluate 
China’s progress. Section 4 evaluates China’s achievement in nanotechnology development 
across four areas—funding, competence building, scientific research, and commercialization and 
application of nanotechnology. Section 5 discusses the so-called Chinese model of 
nanotechnology development and adds concluding remarks. 
 
2. The theory of technological catching-up and reflection on nanotechnology development in 
China 
 
Technological catching-up in East Asian countries or regions, including South Korea, Taiwan, 
China, and Singapore, has been studied intensively by scholars. Research on the information and 
communication technologies industry [6, 7], the semiconductor industry [8], the electronics 
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industry [9], the digital TV industry [10], the computer numerically controlled machine tool 
industry [11, 12], and the telecommunication industry [13, 14] has documented successful cases 
of catching-up in the region. These scholarly studies often discuss the role of government in 
creating conditions that are conducive to successful catching-up. If a window of opportunity for 
firms and industries can be identified by studying the conditions that are necessary for catching-
up, it should be possible for a government to replicate successful cases and enact policies that 
enhance the technology capabilities of firms or industries, improve the business environment in 
which they operate, and ultimately increase the probability of successfully catching-up. We 
discuss China’s progress in nanotechnology in this section by focusing on two issues: conditions 
conducive to catching up and government policies.   
 
2.1 Window of opportunity and conditions conducive to technological catching-up 
 
Perez and Soete [15] argued that there are four entry barriers that latecomers must overcome in 
order to successfully catch up, which include minimal fixed investment, scientific and 
technological knowledge, relevant skills and experience, and location advantages. Fixed 
investment denotes the necessary investment in equipment, machinery, and production lines. 
Latecomers usually incur the cost of producing or assimilating the necessary scientific and 
technological knowledge for innovation, because they have to invest in time and personnel for 
experiments, undergo trial-and-error learning, install equipment and instrumentation, and incur 
prototype expenses. Latecomers’ skills and experience are required throughout the entire 
business process, from purchasing to production to marketing to distribution to sales. The 
location advantages are positive externalities inherent to the environment in which latecomers 
plan to operate. Such advantages might involve distance from equipment suppliers, soundness of 
the transport infrastructure, local availability of competent design, and construction and 
engineering contractors, all of which can make the cost of production significantly different from 
one location to another. 
 
Perez and Soete [15] contended that, in the new product introduction phase, latecomers are not at 
a great disadvantage because the entry barriers they face in terms of fixed investment and 
relevant skills and experience should be low. After all, in a new industry even the leaders are still 
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in the process of generating investment and acquiring the necessary skills and experience. 
However, the requirement involving science and technological knowledge would likely be 
difficult to meet, as original design and engineering demands sound knowledge. The barrier 
involving advantages in location is also likely to be high, as the relationship between producers 
and the environment in which they operate needs to be enhanced to generate positive 
externalities. Perez and Soete concluded that the window of opportunity available to developing 
countries for catching-up lies in the new product introduction phase, especially if such countries 
can accumulate science and technological knowledge and location advantages relatively quickly.  
 
Perez and Soete’s theoretical proposition was supported by a real case, namely South Korea’s 
catching-up in CDMA technology [16]. CDMA technology was an emerging technology when 
the South Korean government and several South Korean firms considered developing the 
country’s cellular phone system. Competing technologies include the analogue system in the US 
and the GSM system in Europe. Because of technological and market uncertainty, some Korean 
service providers and system manufacturers had strong reservations about the plan for 
developing the world’s first CDMA system. However, Samsung, LG, the Ministry of 
Information and Telecommunication and the Electronics and Telecommunication Research 
Institute finally chose the technology because they thought that it would take much less time to 
catch up with the frontrunners in establishing a system based on an emerging technology. South 
Korean firms managed to obtain access to the core technology through the US-based firm 
Qualcomm and diversified the risk of R&D through a public-private consortium. They were 
ultimately able to develop core technologies (chips) for the CDMA system and became world 
leaders.  
 
Supporting Perez and Soete’s view and echoing Lee and Lim’s finding, Niosi and Reid [17] 
argued that large developing countries with strong public sectors that are able and willing to 
maintain a long-term effort to overcome entry barriers should be able to catch up with advanced 
countries in biotechnology and nanotechnology. The Chinese government’s large investment in 
nanotechnology R&D and the corresponding rapid growth in nanotechnology publications and 
patents demonstrated in the previous section suggest that China is overcoming barriers involving 
science and technological knowledge. Given that nanotechnology remains in the initial stage of 
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commercialization as this article is written, requirements in terms of fixed investment, skills and 
experience, and location advantages should not be insurmountably high. We argue that China 
actually stands in a very favorable position from which to pass through the window of 
opportunity.  
 
It may take quite a long time for public investment in China to pay off given the uncertainty of 
nanotechnology. Without funding, however, obsolescence is virtually guaranteed. As the US, 
Europe, Japan, and many other national and regional governments launched nanotechnology 
development strategies in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, it was only logical for 
China to jump on the bandwagon. With considerable scientific and technological knowledge 
already built up, it is possible for China to generate technological breakthroughs on the one hand, 
while on the other hand monitoring and absorbing technological development elsewhere in the 
world on the basis of which to generate its indigenous technological capability. In this sense, 
China’s large public investment in nanotechnology R&D is more of a sure bet because an earlier 
and firmer commitment to the technology means a higher probability that indigenous industry 
will compete effectively when the technology matures. The question remains, however, whether 
the government can institute a policy framework that is conducive to home-grown innovation 
and the emergence of indigenous companies.   
 
2.2 Government policy for promoting technological catching-up 
 
Governments play an indispensable role in technological catching-up in East Asian countries and 
regions. They share the risk with private firms in R&D of new technologies, facilitate indigenous 
firms as they absorb and assimilate advanced foreign technology, and create an environment 
favorable for growth and competitiveness on the part of indigenous firms. Government policy 
instruments include promoting education, training, and research through establishing 
government-funded research institutes; forming public and private R&D consortia; supporting 
market protection, government procurement, and export subsidies; and bargaining with 
multinational enterprises over technological transfer and domestic content requirements. In the 
following discussion, these policies are described in detail with reference to examples provided 
in the literature. 
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Economic catching-up is historically associated with a policy of promoting the development of 
academic institutions. Academic training in chemistry in German and American universities 
contributed greatly to the catching-up and forging ahead of the chemical industry in the two 
countries in the period spanning the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
century [18]. Japanese universities also played an important role in the period during which the 
economy was catching up with its Western counterparts after the Meiji restoration. The Japanese 
government was keen on recruiting foreign scientists and engineers from Western Europe and 
the US to assist local firms in adopting foreign technologies and also to take up teaching and 
research positions in its universities.  
 
Similar stories played out in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. According to Lee [19], the 
South Korean government established a series of government-funded research institutes in the 
1960s and 1970s. The government did not demand an immediate return from these public 
research institutes, instead granting them full autonomy in allocating their operational funds. In 
addition to conducting contract research for industry and training R&D personnel, governmental 
research institutions attracted overseas scientists, many of whom played key roles in developing 
heavy and high-tech industries from the 1970s onward. Moreover, the existence of public 
institutions heightens the social status of scientists and engineers, attracting the best Korean 
students to study science and engineering.  
 
The governments in South Korea and Taiwan also actively promoted public and private R&D 
consortia, which proved to be instrumental in absorbing and assimilating foreign technologies. 
When South Korea developed its CDMA and D-RAM technologies, the R&D consortium forged 
by the government reduced technological uncertainty by offering up-to-date information on 
technology trends and identifying appropriate targets for R&D projects [16]. In the high 
definition TV industry in South Korea, half of the budget for the public and private consortium 
was paid by the government and half was paid by the private sector. The consortium encouraged 
private firms to engage in risky R&D activities by channeling funding and forming a network of 
researchers from industry-related, university-related, and governmental research institutes [10]. 
Similarly, in the Taiwanese computer numerically controlled machine tool industry, a 
government-funded research institute, Mechanical Industry Research Laboratories, assisted 
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private firms in designing machine tools and machining centers and subsidized their R&D costs. 
It was estimated that private firms paid only about one-third of the manpower costs involved in 
running the governmental laboratories. In addition, signing a contract with the laboratories 
usually guaranteed a firm’s access to subsidized bank loans [12]. 
 
Measures providing market protection, export subsidies, and government procurement practices 
favorable to domestic firms were not uncommon in East Asian countries. In the Taiwanese 
machine tool industry, a licensing system was used to prevent the import of machinery when 
equivalent products in terms of price and quality were available locally [12]. In the South Korean 
computer numerically controlled machine tool industry, only domestic companies were allowed 
to supply products below a certain size limit. The size limit was set very large, so most foreign 
lathes could not be imported. The government also set up a buyers’ credit system that was 
composed by the Procurement Fund for Locally-Produced Machinery for domestic users and 
Long-term Credit Financing for foreign buyers [11]. It is worthwhile mentioning that the 
international political and economic environment in the period of 1960–1980, when South Korea 
and Taiwan actively used industrial and trade policies to protect domestic markets and promote 
technological learning, no longer exists. It would be extremely difficult to adopt similar practices 
nowadays because of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules [6]. In addition, a strategy 
privileging market protection, government procurement practices that are favorable to domestic 
firms, and export subsidies is socially sub-optimal. For instance, when the importation of 
computer numerically controlled lathes was restricted in South Korea, local users were left with 
fewer choices and had to purchases less reliable machines from domestic producers [11, 16].   
 
Governments in East Asian countries often bargained with multinational enterprises over 
technological transfer and imposed domestic content requirements on foreign direct investment. 
In the early 1980s, a foreign telecommunications company had to meet the following three 
conditions to set up a joint venture in China: 1) The Chinese side must hold a majority share of 
more than 50 percent; 2) the foreign side must transfer important technology to the Chinese side; 
3) the customized large-scale integrated chips used in telecommunication equipment must be 
produced in cooperation with China. The Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company agreed to 
these conditions and established a joint venture, Shanghai Bell. It trained the first batch of 
 13 
 
Chinese engineers in operating and manufacturing digital automatic switching systems. Without 
this company, there would have been no indigenous digital automatic switching systems and the 
eventual launch of the Chinese telecommunications industry would not have occurred [14]. 
 
Like its counterparts in other East Asian countries that financed R&D to promote technological 
catching-up, the Chinese government acted as the largest source of R&D funding for 
nanotechnology development in the country. Because of technological and market uncertainty, 
corporate investment alone would not have been up to the socially optimal level. It was thus left 
to the government to fill the gap. Public investment was turned into advanced infrastructure, 
equipment, instruments, and up-to-date technological standards, all of which can be considered 
public goods. The funded research projects and positions also attracted scientists and engineers, 
including young researchers, to the field and retained them. All of these conditions established 
the foundation for future industrial development.  
 
Furthermore, Chinese policy makers at the central and local government levels set up several 
new institutions specializing in nanotechnology in the early 2000s. They included the National 
Center for Nanoscience and Technology in Beijing, the National Engineering Research Center 
for Nanotechnology in Shanghai, the China National Academy of Nanotechnology and 
Engineering and Nanotechnology Industrialization Base of China in Tianjin, the Suzhou Institute 
of Nano-tech and Nano-bionics (The Chinese Academy of Sciences), and so on. Among these 
institutions, the National Engineering Research Center for Nanotechnology in Shanghai is a 
limited corporation and also an industry-academy consortium, aiming to promote 
commercialization of nanotechnology.  
 
In all, Chinese policies promoting nanotechnology development resemble those employed in 
promoting technological catching-up in other East Asian countries. Although China’s current 
policy focuses mainly on promoting education and research and industry-academy collaboration, 
as the technology matures additional policy instruments, such as enhanced government 
procurement practices, export subsidies, and technology transfer channels, are expected to be 
adopted as well.  
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3. Strategies for promoting nanotechnology development in China 
 
As Bai [20, 21] documented, when nanotechnology R&D techniques were introduced to China in 
the 1980s, they were well received by Chinese scientists. The Chinese Academy of Sciences, the 
National Natural Science Foundation and the State Science and Technology Commission (the 
predecessor of the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology) started to fund related research. 
In the 1990s, China hosted the 7th International Conference on Scanning Tunneling Microscopy 
(1993) and the 4th International Conference on Nanometer-Scale Science and Technology (1996), 
showcasing Chinese scientists’ early participation in the field. From 1990 to 2002, nearly 1,000 
projects were funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology (or the State Science and 
Technology Commission). Over the same period, the National Natural Science Foundation of 
China approved another 1,000 small-scale grants for projects related to nanotechnology. In short, 
the initiation of nanotechnology R&D in China can be dated back to the 1980s and 1990s. 
Intensive R&D activities did not begin, however, until the early 2000s. 
 
In November 2000, the National Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology was 
established to oversee national policies and coordinate action. The minister of Science and 
Technology was the director of the committee. Vice directors of the committee included vice 
ministers of Science and Technology, the vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
and the vice president of the National Natural Science Foundation. Officials from the Ministry of 
Education, the National Development and Reform Commission (a ministerial agency), and the 
Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense were also involved as 
members of the committee. The National Steering Committee for Nanoscience and 
Nanotechnology involved all the stakeholders and R&D funding organizations in the country, 
making concerted policy action at the national level possible. The committee drafted the first 
Chinese national policy document intended to promote nanotechnology development, which was 
announced as the National Nanotechnology Development Strategy (2001–2010) and was 
reminiscent of similar strategies or initiatives announced in other countries, such as the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative in the US.  
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The National Nanotechnology Development Strategy (2001–2010)—hereafter “the Strategy”—
was composed by four parts. The first part, which introduced “opportunities and challenges,” 
highlighted the challenges that China was facing in the coming era of nanotechnology. The 
second part, which covered “principles,” proposed a set of tenets that nanotechnology 
development in China should follow. The third section of the Strategy focused on the following 
five “targets” that nanotechnology R&D in China should achieve within ten years. The last part 
of the Strategy outlined concrete policy measures and suggestions: 
 
1) Strengthen basic research, construct a nanotechnology-related database, and develop 
national standards 
2) Develop a set of key technologies  
3) Commercialize and apply nanotechnology and upgrade traditional industries through the 
technology 
4) Establish a few key national laboratories and research centers in the field with substantial 
government investment 
5) Foster human resource development and train high caliber research personnel  
 
The Strategy was the first comprehensive action plan designed to promote nanotechnology 
development in China. It emphasized the importance of basic science and called for strengthened 
financial support from the government. It prioritized commercializing nanotechnology and 
appropriating intellectual properties from R&D activities. The Strategy argues that competent 
R&D personnel is a key to the success of nanotechnology development and highlights the need 
for training and retaining scientists in the field, which evinces a long-term view of policy making. 
The Strategy mapped out a blueprint for Chinese nanotechnology development in the following 
decade. Many principles and thoughts expressed in the document have had a far-reaching impact 
on Chinese progress in the field. In the next section of this paper, the five  targets set for 
nanotechnology R&D in China that were supposed to be met by 2010 are analyzed in detail and 
China’s performance regarding each aspect is evaluated (except for the second one, because it is 
extremely difficult to evaluate whether China has successfully developed some particular 
technologies).  
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Another important policy document that is comparable to the Strategy is the National Mid- and 
Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan for 2006–2020 (hereafter the “Plan”), 
launched in March 2006. The Plan was not a policy document specific to nanotechnology, but 
rather a comprehensive document supporting Chinese science and technology development more 
broadly over the following 15 years. The Plan, which sets a number of priorities, represents the 
ambitious goal of sustaining economic growth and social development through home-grown 
innovation and increased government-led R&D investments. In the Plan, nanotechnology was 
highlighted primarily within the section on basic science research. It was considered one of the 
four major scientific research areas (or ‘mega’ projects) to receive substantial governmental 
funding. It was stated in the Plan that “nanotechnology is adopted by many countries as a 
strategic means of enhancing competitiveness and is one of the fields in which China can 
leapfrog technologically.”  
 
4 Evaluation of China’s Achievements in Nanotechnology Development 
 
The National Nanotechnology Development Strategy set five targets for nanotechnology 
development in China, to be met by 2010. In line with these targets, China’s achievements are 
evaluated with reference to the following four aspects: funding, competence building, scientific 
research, and commercialization and application of the technology. 
 
 4.1 Funding 
 
Since the 1980s China has established a series of funding programs that have set various 
priorities for supporting R&D activities in the country. Among these funding programs, the “973 
program,” which supports basic science research, the “863 program,” which finances R&D in 
high-technology, particularly in the high-tech industry, and the “National Key Technology R&D 
program,” which funds technology development, are the three main funding programs led by the 
Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology. The National Natural Science Foundation 
(hereafter “the Foundation”), which is independent of the Ministry of Science and Technology, is 
another important funding agency for basic science research. These programs, together with the 
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funding managed by the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, 
are the main funding sources for nanotechnology R&D in China. 
 
It has been estimated by Chunli Bai, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, that 
Chinese funding of nanotechnology development was equal to about US$160 million from 2001 
to 2004. Such funding doubled each year between 1999 and 2002 [22]. The 973 program began 
to intensively fund nanotechnology research after the late 1990s. In June 2008, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology published the 2008–2010 budgets for all of the 897 projects funded by 
the 973 program during fiscal year 2006-2007. A rough estimation by the authors identified 84 
projects (around 10 percent of the total projects) whose titles contained the word “nanometer.” 
These 84 projects will receive funding in the amount of RMB303 million (US$44 million) during 
the 2008–2010 period, accounting for 15 percent of the total funding from the 973 program over 
that period.  
 
The 863 program supported R&D in nanotechnology under a “nano-material” rubric. Funding 
for the period of 2000–2005 was estimated to have reached RMB200 million (US$29 million) 
[23]. According to Huang et al. [24], the budget for the 863 program was five times greater than 
that of the 973 program in 2004. A rough estimation would suggest that funding under the 863 
program in nanotechnology would be several times greater than that under the 973 program. 
 
The Foundation began funding research in nano-materials after the 1980s. The total budget of the 
Foundation in 2008 amounted to RMB6.3 billion (US$920 million). It was estimated that, 
between 1991 and 2000, Foundation funding to support nanotechnology R&D reached RMB920 
million (US$134 million) [23]. Such financial support was intensified between 2001 and 2003. 
In total, some 800 projects were funded by the Foundation between 2001 and 2003, with total 
budgets amounting to RMB196 million (US$29 million). In 2002, the Foundation included 
“nanotechnology basic science research” as one of several major research plans (mega projects). 
 
Since the late 1990s, China’s Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) has been rapidly catching up 
with its Western counterparts (Figure 4). China’s GERD was about 36 percent, 55 percent, and 
67 percent of those of Germany, France, and the UK in 1998, respectively. However, by 2006, 
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China far surpassed those three countries and significantly closed the gap with Japan, the EU, 
and the US. Such rapid growth in overall R&D investment assures that nanotechnology R&D in 
China will receive increasing amounts of funding from public and private sources every year. As 
China has already become one of the major players in the field in terms of public and private 
R&D investment (Figure 3), it has fulfilled the first objective set in the Strategy with regard to 
increasing R&D funding to strengthen basic research and develop human resources. 
 
(Insert Figure 4 here) 
 
 4.2 Competence building 
 
Universities that are administrated by the Ministry of Education and research institutions that are 
affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences are the major undertakers of basic 
nanotechnology research in China. It was estimated by Bai [21] that more than 50 Chinese 
universities and 20 research institutions in the Chinese Academy of Sciences across the country 
were engaged in basic nanotechnology research in 2005. Table 1 lists the 30 most prolific 
departments and institutions in China. Nine of the 30 departments and institutions are located in 
Beijing, which has made that city the most important center for nanotechnology research in the 
country. From 1998 to 2007, 261 departments or institutes in Chinese universities or the Chinese 
Academy Sciences produced more than 50 nanotechnology articles. Mapping these departments 
and institutes demonstrates that 22 percent are located in Beijing, 14 percent in Shanghai and 10 
percent in Hong Kong (Table 2 and Figure 5). Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong alone 
produced almost half of the Chinese scientific publications in nanotechnology. They are indeed 
the strongholds of basic nanotechnology research in the country. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
(Insert Figure 5 here) 
 
The Chinese nanotechnology R&D system with more than 50 universities and 20 institutions 
under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, with a total of 3,000 researchers involved by the end of 
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2005, was definitely respectable in size. However, the research activities carried out in these 
organizations were scattered across the country and suffered to a certain degree from a lack of 
synergy. The competition among these organizations for research funding made coordinated 
action, for example co-purchasing large and expensive scientific instruments, rather difficult. In 
addition, successful commercialization of nanotechnology depends on strong linkages between 
industry and the academy. Existing universities and institutions that emphasized basic science 
research did not, however, regard commercialization as their primary mission. To tackle these 
challenges, policy makers at the central and local government levels set up several new 
institutions specializing in nanotechnology at the beginning of the 2000s. The National Center 
for Nanoscience and Technology in Beijing and the National Engineering Research Center for 
Nanotechnology in Shanghai are two examples.  
 
The National Center for Nanoscience and Technology (hereafter “the Center”) was co-
established by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Education in March 2003. The 
founding organizations of the Center were the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peking University, 
and Tsinghua University, all of which are predominant players in nanoscience research in China, 
as seen in Table 1. The initial funding for the center was RMB250 million (US$37 million), 
including RMB180 million from the National Development and Reform Commission (a 
ministerial agency), RMB50 million from the Ministry of Education and RMB20 million from 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences [25]. 
 
The Center aimed to gather the scattered resources from various research institutions affiliated 
with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peking University, and Tsinghua University and to 
strengthen cooperation among them. A vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was 
appointed as the first director of the Center, and the vice presidents of Peking University and 
Tsinghua University were two of the four vice directors. The laboratories in the three institutions 
received subsidies from the Center and were included in a network of laboratories set up by the 
Center. Half of the subsidy received by the collaborative laboratories must be used to support 
experiments done by researchers from other organizations, which assures the openness of the 
network.  
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As one of its most important functions, the Center coordinated the development of Chinese 
nanotechnology standards. It hosts the secretariat of the National Committee of Standards on 
Nanotechnology, which approves Chinese standards for nanotechnology. Assisted by the Center, 
the National Committee of Standards on Nanotechnology had developed 15 standards by 2007. 
The Center also submitted standards proposals to the International Origination of Standardization. 
In March 2009, the testing laboratory in the Center was accredited by the China National 
Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment, as a result of which the testing and calibration 
reports issued by the Center are recognized not only within China but also in other countries that 
have signed mutual recognition arrangements with China. 
 
The National Engineering Research Center for Nanotechnology (hereafter “the Engineering 
Center”) was established based on a limited corporation in Shanghai in October 2003. It is 
funded by an industry-academy consortium. The consortium consists of Shanghai Jiaotong 
University, Fudan University, East China Normal University, the Shanghai Institute of 
Microsystem and Information Technology, the Shanghai Institute of Ceramics (the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences), the Zizhu Science-based Industrial Park, the Shanghai Science & 
Technology Investment Co. Ltd., the Bao Steel Group. Of the RMB182 million (US$27 million) 
in initial funding for the Engineering Center, RMB42 million came from the consortium and 
RMB60 million and RMB80 million came from the Shanghai municipal government and the 
central government, respectively [26].  
 
In 2007, a project involved in the development of Ni-H batteries, carried out under the auspices 
of the Engineering Center, was successfully commercialized. The Engineering Center co-funded 
the Shanghai Wanhong Power and Energy Sources Co., Ltd., with the Shanghai Wanhong 
Industrial (Group) Investment Co., Ltd, the Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information 
Technology (a board member and founding organization of the Engineering Center), and the 
Shanghai Huge Development Co., Ltd., to commercialize the technology. The newly established 
company employed 150 staff members by 2009 and produced Ni-H batteries used in electric cars 
and bicycles and other industry sectors.  
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In short, these two newly founded institutions in China were diverse in their missions and 
activities. The National Center for Nanoscience and Technology in Beijing promoted 
cooperation, facilitated the sharing of facilities and equipment, and avoided duplicate 
investments between universities and institutions. It coordinated the development of 
nanotechnology standards in China, which provides a reference point on the basis of which 
governmental agencies can regulate products and markets related to nanotechnology. The 
National Center was also involved in the development of international nanotechnology standards, 
defending China’s interests and participating in rule-setting for future industrial applications. It 
served as a contact point for international academic collaboration and actively promoted 
exchanges with scientific communities outside China. Alternatively, the National Engineering 
Research Center for Nanotechnology in Shanghai strongly emphasized industry-academy 
cooperation in commercializing nanotechnology. Representatives from several Shanghai-based 
venture capital companies and the Science Park sat on the board of the Engineering Center. The 
functions of these newly founded institutions matched up well with the fourth target set by the 
Strategy, according to which China should establish several key national laboratories and 
research centers in the field. 
 
Another important aspect of competence building is training and retaining scientists and 
engineers in the field. We find no specific data regarding the number of scientists and researchers 
engaged in nanotechnology research in China. The best data we can obtain are those that indicate 
the total number of researchers and the number of students enrolled in and graduating from 
postgraduate programs in science and engineering in the country. As nanotechnology spans a 
variety of disciplines, including chemistry, physics, biotechnology, and material sciences, the 
available data on total researchers and science and engineering postgraduate programs arguably 
demonstrate Chinese progress in the field. The total number of Chinese researchers was already 
at 50 percent of the number in the US and the EU-27, and as much as 80 percent of the number 
in Japan. (Figure 6). Steady growth in scientific human resources in the 2000s let China overtake 
Japan and approach the US and the EU-27 in terms of number of researchers (full-time 
equivalent). Since the mid 1990s, enrollment in postgraduate programs in science and 
engineering in Chinese universities has grown rapidly, at an average annual rate of 50 percent 
(Figure 7). In 2006 and 2007, China added 200 thousand new students each year to its science 
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and engineering postgraduate programs and around 150 thousand graduates to its labor market. 
Total enrollment increased steadily, by a factor of six, from nearly 100 thousand in 1995 to 
almost 600 thousand in 2007. We argue that, with strengthened R&D funding, China has 
significantly increased the scale of its training programs as it produces a growing number of 
scientists and engineers for nanotechnology R&D. Such increased funding for research in the 
field also creates more employment opportunities for graduates of science and engineering 
programs and makes it easier to retain them within the academic community. China has therefore 
met the fifth target set in the Strategy with regard to fostering human resource development and 
training high caliber research personnel. 
  
(Insert Figure 6 here) 
 
(Insert Figure 7 here) 
 
 4.3 Scientific Research 
 
As seen in Section 1, China has made impressive progress in basic science research, rapidly 
catching up with Japan, Germany, France, and the UK in terms of the number of Web of Science 
publications it produces. Importantly, China’s rise in the field of nanotechnology should not be 
viewed as an isolated development. China indeed improved its scientific research more broadly 
over the same period. The annual Chinese scientific output measured by number of Web of 
Science articles increased fivefold, from 20,000 to 100,000 between 1998 and 2007 (Figure 8). If 
the number of Chinese nanotechnology publications is plotted together with the number of total 
scientific publications, the two lines follow the same trend.  
 
(Insert Figure 8 here) 
 
The reform and transformation of the Chinese science and technology system also contributed to 
a boom in Chinese nanotechnology publications. China inherited a science and technology 
system from the era of the planned economy. It consisted of a large number of institutions that 
were administered under the Chinese Academy of Sciences and affiliated with ministries. Since 
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1985, the system has undergone continuous transformation. Enhancing efficiency and increasing 
scientific output are among the goals of the series of reforms [27]. To evaluate the scientific 
output of scientists and research units, Chinese universities and research institutions, starting in 
the mid 1990s, began using the number of articles in the Science Citation Index (one of the three 
databases included in the Web of Science) to measure research performance. In many prestigious 
Chinese universities even graduate students were required to publish in journals indexed by the 
Web of Science in order to obtain their degrees. Chinese universities competed with each other 
in funding applications according to the number of Web of Science publications. The adoption of 
this evaluation criterion by the academic community resulted in explosive growth in Web of 
Science publications produced by Chinese scientists.3    
 
It is, of course, important to determine whether the quality of the publications produced by 
Chinese universities and research institutions increased in tandem with the number of 
publications. Quantity alone does not indicate the impact of Chinese research. We develop a 
bibliometric indicator based on citations to measure the quality of nanotechnology publications 
produced by the most prolific countries and institutions worldwide. It is known that articles or 
journals that publish basic science research outcomes should be cited, on average, more often 
than those focusing on applied science are. Similarly, institutions that are committed to basic 
research should receive more citations of their publications than those working in applied science 
fields. To correct this bias of measurement regarding citations, we use the aggregate impact 
factors of subject categories in the Journal Citation Reports of the Web of Science to discount 
the advantage associated with basic science research.4  
                                                 
3
 This prevalent evaluation criterion was criticized however by many observers, who argued that it made Chinese 
scientists overly focused on publishing in low-impact (easy) journals indexed by Science Citation Index in order to 
obtain a larger number of publications, instead of improving the quality of their research to publish in high-impact 
(difficult) journals [28]. 
4
 Journal Citation Reports science edition indexed 6,426 journals in its 2007 issues, which are classified into 172 
subject categories. Journal Citation Reports publishes an aggregate impact factor for each journal and subject 
category from 2003 onwards. An aggregate impact factor for a subject category of 1.0 indicates that, on average, 
articles in that subject category published one or two years earlier have been cited just once. As seen in Journal 
Citation Reports, articles published one or two years earlier in journals that fall into the subject category of materials 
science & ceramics were, on average, cited 0.9 times. Articles in the subject category of physics, atomic, molecular 
& chemical were cited 2.3 times. Let’s assume that publications from Institution A, which largely fall into the 
category of material science and ceramics, were cited 1.8 times. This means that the quality of publications of 
Institution A is well above the world average level, which is 0.9. If we assume, however, that publications from 
Institution B, which are mainly in the field of physics, atomic, molecular & chemical, were cited also 1.8 times, then 
the quality of Institution B publications is inferior to the world average level, which is 2.3. It thus would be 
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Acknowledging differences in citation patterns of publications in various subject categories, we 
multiply the share of the total publications of an institution in each of the 172 subject categories 
of Journal Citation Reports by the aggregate impact factor of each subject category and sum the 
products together. The sum of the products can be understood as the expected cited times of 
publications from this institution given its publication portfolio, assuming the quality of its 
publications reaches the world average level.5 After obtaining expected cited times of 
publications for each of the most prolific institutions, we subsequently divide the actual cited 
times of their publications by the expected cited times to get a citation score for each of these 
institutions. By the same token, the citation scores for the world’s most prolific countries are 
calculated as well.  
 
Table 3 shows that China was ranked 35th in the world by citation score in 1998. Its ranking had 
improved to 23rd by 2002 but dropped to 27th in 2006, well behind the most advanced countries 
in the world. Most Chinese universities score much higher when ranked by number of 
nanotechnology publications than by citation scores (Table 4). It is well known, however, that 
citation is only one proxy among others to indicate the quality of a publication. In addition, 
citation is affected by multiple factors other than quality of publication, such as network of 
scholars and the openness of a national innovation system [29, 30]. A scholar who is more 
visible and active in the international academic community is more likely to be cited by peers in 
other countries. This is why we argue that China can benefit from international collaboration if it 
wishes to enhance its nanotechnology research profile and accordingly achieve greater global 
impact. From 1998 to 2007, about 17 percent of Chinese nanotechnology papers involved 
international collaboration. Figure 9 shows that the top 20 countries with which Chinese scholars 
collaborated in nanotechnology include the US, Japan, Germany, Singapore, and the UK, among 
others. Collaborative articles with scientists from the US accounted for just over 5 percent of 
total Chinese nanotechnology publications in the period of 1998–2007. The percentage of cited 
articles co-authored with scientists from these 20 countries is invariably higher than the 
percentage of cited Chinese non-collaborative articles, which clearly indicates that Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                             
misleading to directly compare the average cited times of nanotechnology publications from different institutions or 
countries without considering differences in subject categories of those publications. 
5
 For example, if an institution has one-third of its publications in the category of materials science & ceramics, and 
the remaining two-thirds in physics, atomic, molecular & chemical, the expected cited times would equal  
0.9*0.33+2.3*0.67=1.84. 
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scientists have benefited from the “international collaboration dividend,” as coined by Tyfield et 
al [30]. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
(Insert Figure 9 here) 
 
To summarize, China has strengthened its basic nanotechnology science research (the first target 
set in the Strategy), as measured by number of scientific publications. However, the citation rates 
of Chinese publication still lag behind those of the most advanced countries. Whether or not we 
can rigorously interpret citation as a proxy for quality of publications, China has benefited from 
international collaboration as collaborative works with foreign scholars have received more 
citations than works authored only by Chinese scholars, and thus have had greater impact. We 
argue that China should continuously to focus on and make efforts to promote international 
collaboration, which will create a win-win situation not only for Chinese scientists but also for 
their international peers. 
 
 4.4 Commercialization and application of the technologies 
 
The intensive public investment in nanotechnology R&D in China we have observed over the 
past decade has paid off to a certain degree, as China has produced the second highest number of 
scientific publications in the world after 2003, trailing only the US. However, scientific 
publication itself is not the ultimate goal of technology development. Ideally, China’s lead in 
basic science research would be transformed into the competitiveness of traditional industries 
that are upgraded by nanotechnology or by the emergence of new industries and employment 
opportunities that can bring economic growth. We argue that China has not yet performed 
extraordinarily in this regard.  
 
First, industry R&D has remained weak. Corporate funding in China was only 40 percent of 
government funding during the period of 2005–2007 (Figure 3). In contrast, industry in general 
accounted for 72.3 percent of total Chinese R&D expenditure in 2007 [31]. Differing from what 
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has occurred in China, corporate funding by American and Japanese enterprises far surpassed 
government funding, arguably because firms from these two countries were equipped with 
advanced technological capabilities that allow them to appropriate the return on R&D investment. 
Bai [21] estimated that only about 300 firms in China engaged in business activities related to 
nanotechnology in 2005. The majority of indigenous Chinese firms have not established a high 
level of international competitiveness based on technological advancement, innovation, or R&D. 
It has been easier for them to purchase advanced production lines or blueprints from domestic or 
foreign suppliers and leverage their low-cost manufacturing capability to compete domestically 
or internationally. Seeking to transfer cutting-edge technologies from universities and research 
institutions is costly and risky. There thus are not enough incentives from the demand side for 
Chinese firms to engage in nanotechnology R&D. That’s why, percentage-wise, Chinese 
nanotechnology patent applications accounted for only a tiny share, 0.5 percent, 0.5 percent, and 
0.2 percent of the world’s accumulated applications in the US Patent Office (USPTO), the 
European Patent Office (EPO), and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), respectively (Table 5).  
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
In addition, among these patent applications, 50 percent were filed by public organizations 
including universities, research institutes, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Only 42 
percent were applied for by industry representatives (Figure 10), whereas in other industrialized 
countries industry is the main performer of industrial development and leading patent applicant. 
Although China gained on the leading patenting countries with a high growth rate in patent 
applications (Figure 2), a substantial proportion of these patent applications were filed by 
universities and research institutions, given the weak patenting performance of indigenous 
Chinese companies. A study conducted by Parker et al. [32], which examines patent applications 
submitted to the Chinese Patent Office (State Intellectual Property Office) from 1991 to 2006, 
resulted in a similar finding that 63 percent of nanotechnology patents originating in China 
originated either with Chinese universities or with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. By contrast, 
an overwhelming majority of US applications to the Chinese Patent Office were from the private 
sector. Through interviews with nanotechnology scientists and companies, Shapira and Wang 
[33] offered an explanation of these findings. Scholars in the Chinese Academy of Science and 
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from universities were incentivized to apply for patents because patent applications as well as 
publications were important elements for career development and promotion, and also for 
meeting the deliverable targets of their research projects funded by the government. In contrast, 
most indigenous Chinese companies lacked technological capabilities on the basis of which to 
fully assess the prototype technology developed in public research institutions and universities. 
Such organizations were established for the purpose of profiting from their core technologies and 
have no long-term research agenda. In addition to seeking modest technological advice and using 
equipment and facilities, these companies did not interact to a significant extent with universities 
or research institutions.  
 
 (Insert Figure 10 here) 
 
A close look of the geographical distribution of Chinese academic nanotechnology research 
centers and patent application and commercialization hotspots convinces us that the academic 
research supporting technology and industrial development and production is performed in 
various locations with only loose links between them. As seen in Table 6, Beijing, the capital 
city in the north, hosted 22.2 percent of the departments or institutions that published more than 
50 publications and filed 37.4 percent of the country’s patent applications. However, Beijing 
hosted only 6.4 percent of the listed companies that engage in business activities related to 
nanotechnology.6 Controlling for the share of general listed companies from Beijing in China’s 
total listed companies (7.7 percent), we confirm that 6.4 percent is actually smaller than what 
would be expected if nanotechnology-related business activities were distributed equally across 
the country. Beijing is a center of academic research and patenting activities, but not a hotspot of 
industrial development and production.  
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
Guangdong in Southern China is, by contrast, home to merely 1.9 percent of the departments or 
institutions that have published more than 50 nanotechnology articles or applied for 8.3 percent 
                                                 
6
 The analysis of nanotechnology-related business activities is performed only on listed companies. There is no 
statistical information available for nanotechnology start-ups or small and medium enterprises in China, although 
they are considered to be important in commercializing new technologies as well.  
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of patents, but it hosted 12.1 percent of the listed companies engaging in nanotechnology-related 
business. Guangdong is definitely not an academic research center, but it is an important location 
for industrial applications. Similar to Guangdong, Zhejiang accounted for a small share in basic 
research and patent applications, but concentrated a significant share in industrial activities. 
Readers are advised that Beijing, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Shanghai plus Tianjin are 
the six most highly developed provinces in China in terms of GDP per capita and all are known 
for having sound infrastructure, an open business environment, abundant financial resources, and 
a concentration of human resources. There is no other reason to explain the conspicuous 
differences in their respective performances in nanotechnology R&D and related business 
activities other than that basic research, technology development, and industrial production of 
nanotechnology in China are carried out separately. An increasing proportion of public funding 
was poured into universities and research institutions affiliated with the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, which are largely concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai (Beijing, Shanghai and Hong 
Kong alone produced almost half of all Chinese nanotechnology publications). Such public R&D 
investment has resulted in a boom in scientific publications and expansion of the research system 
in some locations. However, the commercialization of technology has been weak, and industrial 
development and production have remained detached from the scientific research system.  
 
As discussed in Section 4.2, a number of new institutes established to promote 
commercialization were set up within the Science Park or near industrial zones in Shanghai and 
other cities such as Tianjin (the China National Academy of Nanotechnology and Engineering 
and Nanotechnology Industrialization Base of China) and Suzhou (the Suzhou Institute of Nano-
tech and Nano-bionics, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Suzhou BioBay in Sino-
Singapore Industrial Park). To meet the third target of the Strategy with regard to 
commercialization, China needs to continue its effort along this channel to further strengthen 
industry-academy collaboration.  
 
To summarize, China has made tremendous efforts over the past decade to develop and promote 
nanotechnology. An evaluation of the Chinese performance according to targets set in the 
national strategy announced in 2001 points out that China has performed well in areas such as 
strengthening basic research, constructing nanotechnology-related databases, and developing 
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national standards; in establishing national key laboratories and research centers in the field with 
substantial government investment; and in fostering human resource development and training 
high caliber research personnel. However, China has encountered enormous difficulty in 
commercializing the technology and upgrading traditional industries through nanotechnology, 
due to the limited technological capabilities of indigenous companies and a lack of incentives to 
induce them to actively engage in industrial development and commercialization.  
 
5 Conclusion: The China Model 
 
In an early study, Perez and Soete [15] argued that minimal fixed investment, skills and 
experience, location advantages, and scientific and technological knowledge are the four barriers 
facing latecomers when entering an emerging field or industry. In the past decade since China 
launched its national strategy to promote nanotechnology development, the country has devoted 
an increasing amount of R&D investment to the field, produced a soaring number of scientific 
publications, established several new specialized institutions, and expanded its postgraduate 
program in science and engineering to train nanotechnology scientists and engineers. China’s 
improvement is real and substantial, not a scientometric mirage. All these achievements indicate 
that China has been accumulating sufficient science and technological knowledge to overcome 
the entry barriers. Given that nanotechnology is still in an initial stage of commercialization, 
requirements in terms of fixed investment, skills and experience, and location advantages should 
not be extremely high. The hope that China can pass through a window of opportunity to catch 
up and become a leading nation in the field has never been higher. 
 
It may take quite a long time for public investment on the part of the Chinese government to pay 
off, given the uncertainty of nanotechnology. However, the absence of funding will definitely 
lead to the certainty of obsolescence. As the US, Europe, Japan, and numerous national and 
regional governments launched their respective nanotechnology development strategies in the 
late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, it would be only logical for China to jump on the 
bandwagon. In this sense, China’s large and resolute public investment in nanotechnology R&D 
is more of a sure bet because only with it can China enjoy a first mover’s advantage in nurturing 
human resources, developing R&D capacity, and promoting learning capablities, all of which 
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will ultimately result in a higher probability that indigenous industry will emerge and compete 
effectively in the global arena. 
 
An evaluation of the Chinese performance according to targets set in the national strategy a 
decade ago points out, however, that China has still lagged behind most of the advanced 
countries in terms of the impact (citations) of its scientific research. China has not yet performed 
satisfactorily in the areas of commercialization and application of the technology. Percentage-
wise, China has accounted for only a tiny share in the accumulated nanotechnology patent 
applications in US, EU, and Japanese patent offices. Evidence shows that basic research, 
technology development, and industrial production of nanotechnology in China are carried out in 
separate systems and locations and are detached from each other. Due to limited the 
technological capabilities of indigenous companies and a lack of incentives for them to actively 
engage in R&D, the major challenges for latecomer countries such as China that seek to further 
catch up with the advanced leaders remain in the area of commercialization. Whether China can 
successfully promote academy-industry collaboration, or leverage venture capital or other means 
to facilitate technology transfer from labs to firms will ultimately determine China’s catching-up 
performance in the nanotechnology field. 
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Table 1: The 30 Most Prolific Departments or Institutions of China in Nanotechnology: 
1998–2007 
 
Rank Number of Web of Science articles University or Institution Department City and Province 
1 2360 Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemistry Beijing 
2 1713 Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Physics Beijing 
3 1668 Chinese Academy of Sciences Graduate School Beijing 
4 1485 Chinese Academy of Sciences Changchun Institute of Applied Chemistry 
Changchun, Jilin 
Province 
5 1472 Nanjing University Department of Physics Nanjing, Jiangsu Province 
6 1288 Chinese Academy of Sciences Shanghai Institute of Ceramics Shanghai 
7 1178 University of Science and Technology of China Department of Chemistry 
Hefei, Anhui 
Province 
8 1139 Jilin University Department of Chemistry Changchun, Jilin Province 
9 1075 Peking University College of Chemistry and Molecular Engineering Beijing 
10 889 Tsinghua University Department of Material Science and Engineering Beijing 
11 850 Tsinghua University Department of Chemistry Beijing 
12 805 University of Science and Technology of China 
Structure Research 
Laboratory 
Hefei, Anhui 
Province 
13 774 City University of Hong Kong Department of Physics and Material Science Hong Kong 
14 722 Fudan University Department of Chemistry Shanghai 
15 663 Chinese Academy of Sciences Lanzhou Institute of Chemical Physics 
Lanzhou, Gansu 
Province 
16 583 Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Solid State Physics 
Hefei, Anhui 
Province 
17 527 Wuhan University Department of Chemistry Wuhan, Hubei Province 
18 489 Nankai University Department of Chemistry Tianjin 
19 473 Peking University Department of Physics Beijing 
20 473 Tsinghua University Department of Physics Beijing 
21 465 Zhejiang University Department of Material Science and Engineering 
Hangzhou, 
Zhejiang Province 
22 464 Zhejiang University Department of Chemistry Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 
23 404 Zhejiang University State Key Laboratory of Silicon Material 
Hangzhou, 
Zhejiang Province 
24 397 Shandong University State Key Laboratory of Crystal Material 
Jinan, Shandong 
Province 
25 365 China Center of Advanced Science 
and Technology World Laboratory  Beijing 
26 341 University of Hong Kong Department of Physics Hong Kong 
27 337 Chinese Academy of Sciences Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics Shanghai 
28 327 Wuhan University Department of Physics Wuhan, Hubei Province 
29 323 Zhejiang University Department of Physics Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 
30 322 University of Hong Kong Department of Chemistry Hong Kong 
Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 2: The Location of Departments or Institutes Producing 50 Web of Science 
Nanotechnology Publications or More, 1998–2007 
 
City Name Abbreviation Number of Departments and Institutes Percent 
Beijing BJ 58 22.2% 
Shanghai SH 37 14.2% 
Hong Kong HK 26 10.0% 
Hefei HF 18 6.9% 
Changchun CC 14 5.4% 
Nanjing NJ 14 5.4% 
Wuhan WH 12 4.6% 
Jinan JN 9 3.4% 
Shenyang SY 8 3.1% 
Changsha CS 7 2.7% 
Hangzhou HZ 6 2.3% 
Lanzhou LZ 6 2.3% 
Chengdu CD 5 1.9% 
Dalian DL 5 1.9% 
Guangzhou GZ 5 1.9% 
Tianjin TJ 5 1.9% 
Xiamen XM 4 1.5% 
Harbin HB 3 1.1% 
Xian XA 3 1.1% 
Fuzhou FZ 3 1.1% 
Kaifeng KF 2 0.8% 
Suzhou SZ 2 0.8% 
Baoding BD 1 0.4% 
Chongqing CQ 1 0.4% 
Liaocheng LC 1 0.4% 
Qingdao QD 1 0.4% 
Taiyuan TY 1 0.4% 
Urumqi UQ 1 0.4% 
Wuhu WU 1 0.4% 
Xiangtan XT 1 0.4% 
Zhengzhou ZZ 1 0.4% 
Total  261 100.0% 
Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 3: Ranking of China by Citation Scores among the World’s Most Prolific Countries 
(Regions) and European Union Member States (1998, 2002, and 2006) 
Rank 2006 2002 1998 
 Country (Region) Citation Score Country (Region) 
Citation 
Score Country (Region) Citation Score 
1 Netherlands 2.589 USA 9.747 Switzerland 14.243 
2 Switzerland 2.369 Switzerland 8.485 USA 14.036 
3 USA 2.265 Belgium 8.309 Netherlands 13.862 
4 Denmark 2.060 Netherlands 8.028 Denmark 12.180 
5 United Kingdom 2.015 Israel 8.004 Israel 11.571 
6 Singapore 1.982 Denmark 7.835 Ireland 11.421 
7 Germany 1.947 Austria 7.779 Sweden 11.230 
8 Canada 1.912 United Kingdom 7.715 Finland 11.079 
9 Israel 1.861 Ireland 7.684 United Kingdom 11.073 
10 Spain 1.861 Finland 7.634 Canada 10.448 
11 Australia 1.855 Singapore 7.535 Singapore 10.241 
12 Austria 1.824 Germany 7.520 Germany 10.136 
13 Sweden 1.772 France 6.916 France 9.366 
14 France 1.720 Canada 6.856 Belgium 8.912 
15 Ireland 1.696 South Korea 6.846 Austria 8.880 
16 Belgium 1.688 Sweden 6.782 Australia 8.439 
17 Finland 1.671 Australia 6.695 Estonia 8.302 
18 Portugal 1.574 Italy 6.621 Spain 8.223 
19 Italy 1.574 Spain 6.395 Japan 7.913 
20 Japan 1.532 Taiwan 6.199 Italy 7.911 
21 Czech Republic 1.476 Portugal 6.026 Hungary 7.821 
22 Greece 1.442 Japan 5.902 Portugal 7.571 
23 South Korea 1.428 Peoples R China 5.418 Greece 7.375 
24 Estonia 1.396 Latvia 5.368 Slovenia 6.915 
25 Slovenia 1.361 Greece 5.283 Latvia 6.700 
26 Taiwan 1.359 Slovenia 5.201 Lithuania 6.659 
27 Peoples R China 1.327 Czech Republic 5.189 Brazil 6.547 
28 Hungary 1.224 Hungary 5.081 Czech Republic 6.242 
29 Bulgaria 1.182 Turkey 4.747 South Korea 6.084 
30 Latvia 1.176 India 4.669 India 5.930 
31 India 1.149 Mexico 4.495 Taiwan 5.876 
32 Lithuania 1.143 Bulgaria 4.485 Romania 5.758 
33 Poland 1.136 Romania 4.442 Turkey 5.430 
34 Brazil 1.076 Brazil 4.254 Mexico 5.367 
35 Slovakia 1.041 Poland 4.010 Peoples R China 5.285 
36 Turkey 1.011 Lithuania 3.746 Poland 5.206 
37 Russia 0.980 Slovakia 3.741 Slovakia 5.049 
38 Mexico 0.927 Russia 3.335 Bulgaria 4.962 
39 Ukraine 0.851 Estonia 3.263 Russia 4.628 
40 Romania 0.827 Ukraine 3.177 Ukraine 3.738 
Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. Authors’ own calculation. 
Note: 1. The citation scores of 1998 are greater than those of 2002 and 2006 because by April, 2008, when the 
analysis was performed, articles published in 1998 had been cited more times than those published more recently, 
e.g., in 2002 or 2006.  
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Table 4: Ranking of Chinese Institutions that are among the World’s 150 Most Prolific 
Institutions by Citation Scores  
Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. Authors’ own calculation. 
Institution Country Citation Score 
Rank by 
Citation Score 
Rank by Number of 
Publications in 2006 
Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol Hong Kong, China 2.391 33 109 
Peking Univ China 1.919 77 29 
Hunan Univ China 1.729 94 112 
Nankai Univ China 1.681 99 66 
Nanjing Univ China 1.674 101 21 
Tsing Hua Univ China 1.664 103 5 
City Univ Hong Kong Hong Kong, China 1.641 106 125 
Univ Sci & Technol China China 1.575 115 17 
Chinese Acad Sci China 1.575 116 1 
Fudan Univ China 1.547 119 25 
Dalian Univ Technol China 1.449 127 119 
Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ China 1.417 130 28 
Wuhan Univ China 1.278 132 67 
Jilin Univ China 1.259 134 23 
Zhejiang Univ China 1.255 135 10 
Tianjin Univ China 1.169 139 71 
Shandong Univ China 1.112 142 68 
Harbin Inst Technol China 0.986 146 81 
Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol China 0.966 147 97 
Sichuan Univ China 0.793 149 91 
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Table 5: Share of Accumulated Nanotechnology Patent Applications in the US Patent Office, 
European Patent Office and Japanese Patent Office: 1928–2009 (Percentage) 
 
USPTO EPO JPO 
US 50.3 US 30.5 Japan 95.4 
Japan 20.3 Japan 20.6 US 2.0 
Germany 3.6 Germany 15.9 Germany 0.4 
South Korea 3.3 France 5.9 France 0.3 
France 1.9 UK 4.8 South Korea 0.2 
UK 1.8 Netherlands 3.1 UK 0.2 
Netherlands 1.7 Switzerland 2.7 Switzerland 0.2 
Taiwan 1.4 South Korea 2.4 China 0.2 
Canada 1.1 Italy 1.7 Other Countries 1.0 
Switzerland 0.9 Belgium 1.4   
China 0.5 China 0.5   
Other 
countries 13.1 
Other 
Countries 10.5   
 
Data source: PATSTAT database (September 2009 version). Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 6: Geographical Mismatch of China’s Nanotechnology Academic Research Centers, 
Patent Applications, and Commercialization Hotspots 
 
Provinces 
Number of the 
departments or 
institutions with 
more than 50 
nanotechnology 
publications 
(Percentage in 
national total) 
Number of 
nanotechnology 
patent applications 
in PASTAT 
databse 
(Percentage in 
national total) 
Number of listed 
nanotechnology 
companies 
(Percentage in 
national total) 
Number of general 
listed companies 
(Percentage in 
national total) 
Beijing 58 (22.2%) 279 (37.4%) 10 (6.4%) 135 (7.7%) 
Guangdong 5 (1.9%) 60 (8.3%) 19 (12.1%) 240 (13.7%) 
Jiangsu 16 (6.1%) 41 (5.5%) 15 (9.6%) 129 (7.4%) 
Shanghai 37 (14.2%) 81 (10.8%) 19 (12.1%) 159 (9.1%) 
Zhejiang 6 (2.3%) 6 (0.8%) 15 (9.6%) 143 (8.2%) 
National total 261 (100.0%) 743 (100.0%) 157 (100.0%) 1751 (100.0%) 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
Note: 
1. The listed nanotechnology companies are the listed firms that have declared that they engage in business activities 
related to the technology in their annual reports. Annual reports of the Chinese listed companies are from the China 
Infobank database.  
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Figure 1: The World’s 10 Most Prolific Countries in the Nanotechnology Field: 1998–2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. Authors’ own calculation. 
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Figure 2: The Top 10 Countries and China (13th) in terms of Nanotechnology Patent Application: 
1998–2007  
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: PATSTAT database (September 2009 version). Authors’ own calculation. 
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Figure 3: Estimated Government and Corporate Nanotechnology Funding (PPP US$ Million), 
2005–2007 
 
 
 
Source: Lux Research (2008). 
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Figure 4: China’s Gross Expenditure on R&D (million current PPP $) as a Percentage of the 
R&D Expenditure of France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US (1998–2006) 
 
 
Source: OECD Science and Technology Statistics.
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Figure 5: The Location of the Departments or Institutes Producing 50 Web of Science 
Nanotechnology Publications or More, 1998–2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. Authors’ own calculation. 
Note: 1. Abbreviation of city names are seen in Table 2. 
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Figure 6: China’s Total Researchers (Full-Time Equivalent) as a Percentage of the Total 
Researchers of the US, EU-27 and Japan (1998–2006) 
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Source: OECD Science and Technology Statistics. 
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Figure 7: Number and Growth of Enrollment and Graduates of Postgraduate Programs in the 
Field of Science and Engineering in China: 1995–2007 
 
 
 
Source: various issues of China Statistical Yearbook. 
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Figure 8: China’s Total Scientific Publications and Nanotechnology Publications Indexed by the 
Web of Science 
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Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. Authors’ own calculation. 
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Figure 9: Comparison of the Shares of Cited Articles among the Chinese Collaborative Articles 
and Non-Collaborative Articles: 1998–2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications. Authors’ own calculation.
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Figure 10: Breakdown of the Chinese Nanotechnology Patent Applications by Types of 
Assignees 
 
 
 
 
Data source: PATSTAT database (September 2009 version). Authors’ own calculation. 
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